University of St. Thomas, Minnesota

UST Research Online
Philosophy Faculty Publications

Philosophy

2007

How Should Catholics Vote? Bringing Moral
Principles to Life
Stephen J. Heaney
University of St. Thomas, Minnesota, sjheaney@stthomas.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.stthomas.edu/cas_phil_pub
Part of the Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons, and the Ethics and Political Philosophy
Commons
Recommended Citation
Heaney, Stephen J., "How Should Catholics Vote? Bringing Moral Principles to Life" (2007). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 9.
http://ir.stthomas.edu/cas_phil_pub/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UST Research Online. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UST Research Online. For more information, please contact libroadmin@stthomas.edu.

How Should Catholics Vote?
Bringing Moral Principles to Life

As a follow-up to Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Evangelium vitae
(The Gospel of Life), the Bishops of the United States released, in 1998, a
remarkable (yet little remarked) document entitled “Living the Gospel of
Life: A Challenge to American Catholics.” In November of 2002, the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith published a “Doctrinal Note
on some questions regarding the participation of Catholics in political
life,” which, after a momentary flurry, also slipped to the back of people’s
minds. These documents contain centuries of wisdom, not only practical
but speculative, on the nature of participation in the life of our cities,
regions and nations. Of particular interest is their statement of the
principles which should govern the participation of citizens--both directly
as lawmakers, and indirectly through their representatives--and the
clear assertion of the primacy of the protection of human life, and of
those rights and freedoms necessary to our living humanly.

Consider the following statements from these documents,
statements which are extraordinary for their strength and clarity. First,
from “Living the Gospel of Life”:
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Opposition to abortion and euthanasia does not excuse
indifference to those who suffer from poverty, violence and
injustice. Any politics of human life must work to resist the
violence of war and the scandal of capital punishment. Any politics
of human dignity must seriously address issues of racism, poverty,
hunger, employment, housing, and health care. Therefore,
Catholics should eagerly involve themselves as advocates for the
weak and marginalized in all these areas. Catholic public officials
are obliged to address each of these issues as they seek to build
consistent policies which promote respect for the human person at
all stages of life. But being ‘right’ in such matters can never excuse
a wrong choice regarding direct attacks on innocent human life.
Indeed, the failure to protect and defend life in its most vulnerable
stages renders suspect any claims to the rightness of positions in
other matters affecting the poorest and least powerful of the
human community. If we understand the human person as the
“temple of the Holy Spirit”—the living house of God—then these
latter issues fall logically into place as the crossbeams and walls of
that house. All direct attacks on innocent human life, such as
abortion and euthanasia, strike at the house’s foundation. These
directly and immediately violate the human person’s most
fundamental right—the right to life. Neglect of these issues is the
equivalent of building our house on sand.1

Next, from the Congregation’s “Doctrinal Note on some questions
regarding the participation of Catholics in political life”:

[A] well-formed Christian conscience does not permit one to vote
for a political program or an individual law which contradicts the
fundamental contents of faith and morals. The Christian faith is
an integral unity, and thus it is incoherent to isolate some
particular element to the detriment of the whole of Catholic
doctrine. . . . When political activity comes up against moral
principles that do not admit of exception, compromise or
derogation, the Catholic commitment becomes more evident and
laden with responsibility. In the face of fundamental and
inalienable ethical demands, Christians must recognize that what
is at stake is the essence of the moral law, which concerns the
integral good of the human person. This is the case with laws
concerning abortion and euthanasia . . . . Such laws must defend
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the basic right to life from conception to natural death. In the
same way, it is necessary to recall the duty to respect and protect
the rights of the human embryo. Analogously, the family needs to
be safeguarded and promoted, based on monogamous marriage
between a man and a woman, and protected in its unity and
stability in the face of modern laws on divorce: in no way can other
forms of cohabitation be placed on the same level as marriage, nor
can they receive legal recognition as such. The same is true for the
freedom of parents regarding the education of their children; it is
an inalienable right recognized by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. In the same way, one must consider society’s
protection of minors and freedom from modern forms of slavery
(drug abuse and prostitution, for example). In addition, there is
the right to religious freedom and the development of an economy
that is at the service of the human person and of the common
good, with respect for social justice, the principles of human
solidarity and subsidiarity . . . .2
Despite such forceful statements, these matters have been a cause
of deep division among Catholics. The fear, of course, is that the Church
hierarchy might appear to be “telling Catholics how to vote.” Direct
support for particular candidates would be troubling from a
constitutional point of view, and problematic with respect to freedom of
conscience. In trying to avoid the appearance of dictating votes, however,
we must not be afraid to spell out the proper principles of action, even if
doing so makes it obvious that certain candidates are beyond the pale.
In this paper, I will attempt to do two things. First, I will attempt
to ground the claims of these two documents in the constant teaching of
the Magisterium, particularly as that is embodied in the social
encyclicals of the popes from Leo XIII through John Paul II. These are
not ad hoc pronouncements, but the culmination of long and careful
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thought on the nature of the human person, morality, law and the social
order. Second, I will attempt to draw out the implications of this
teaching for specific sorts of voting situations. People of good will, then,
will have available to them a principled guide to a very important moral
act.

I: The Duty of Catholic Participation
Christians have a moral duty to participate in the life of society in
whatever manner is open to them. Christians are called to bring the
Good News to the world, to evangelize the culture faithfully. “Christ’s
redemptive work, while essentially concerned with the salvation of men,
includes also the renewal of the whole temporal order. Hence the mission
of the Church is not only to bring the message and grace of Christ to
men, but also to penetrate and perfect the temporal order with the spirit
of the Gospel.”3 Lay people, in particular, are called to shape the secular
world.4
In order to carry out this task faithfully, all Catholics have the
responsibility to learn and understand the principles which apply.5 It is
further our duty to live a consistent life, that is, to apply the moral
principles of human action not just to one sphere of life, but to all
spheres. There is in this regard no separation between public and
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private, or between religious and secular.6 This is the case even in a
pluralistic democracy like our own. John Paul II puts it this way:

Nowadays there is a tendency to claim that agnosticism and
skeptical relativism are the philosophy and the basic attitude
which correspond to democratic forms of political life. . . . As
history demonstrates, a democracy without values easily turns
into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism.7
Without ignoring the danger of fanaticism, we must admit that freedom
can be attained only through respect for the truth. Since Jesus is “the
Way, the Truth and the Life,” we cannot achieve the peace which all
persons seek by means of law and government unless Christ and his
Church enter into the life of society.8
If religion is not a purely private affair, then we are called to bring
Christian principles to bear on our world wherever this is possible.9 One
place where this is possible, and desirable, is the voting booth.10 The
Catechism of the Catholic Church concludes, therefore, that "coresponsibility for the common good make[s] it morally obligatory . . . to
exercise the right to vote . . . ."11
If the state is operating legitimately in every respect, there will be
no conflict of principles between the state and the Church. As history
shows, this often has not been the case. If conflict arises between the
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actions of the state or the policies of a political party, on the one hand,
and Catholic teaching on faith and morals, on the other hand, it should
be clear that one's proper path is to adhere to the faith.12 There is, of
course, a distinction to be made here. We are not bound to a prudential
decision or policy followed by Church officials when no basic principle of
faith or morals is at stake.13 One may not, however, abandon Church
teaching on matters of faith and morals for the sake of expediency.
Both John XXIII and Paul VI urged collaboration, where possible,
between Catholics and non-Catholics on projects designed to bring about
good ends desired by both groups. This cooperation is an important
element in evangelizing the culture, bringing the Christian perspective
to bear on society and politics. One might wonder, however, whether the
second part of the message was ever heard: We must be extremely
cautious about how we cooperate with those who do not share our
religious and moral convictions. "[T]he Christian must make a wise and
vigilant choice and avoid involving himself in collaboration without
conditions and contrary to the principles of a true humanism, even in the
name of a genuinely felt solidarity."14 A Catholic electorate, rightly eager
to tackle such pressing social concerns as poverty and civil rights, joined
wholeheartedly with others who, for entirely different reasons, sought
the same goals. However, strong utilitarian and libertarian beliefs—
beliefs which are not compatible with a Catholic understanding of the
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basic principles of human action—often drive the political agenda in this
country. Without guidance from those who should have articulated the
proper moral principles, Catholics all too often have adopted these false
premises to support their political agendas. Later, when the time came
to argue, for example, about abortion, the average Catholic no longer had
the vocabulary for opposition to utilitarian and libertarian arguments, as
a matter either of morality or law.15 Before entering into any specific
arguments about voting, then, let us remind ourselves of that vocabulary
by reviewing the Church’s teaching on the origins of, and relationship
between, civil law and natural law.

II: The Source of Law
Almost everything the Church teaches regarding our
responsibilities to state and society is grounded, not in revelation, but in
natural law, "the law written in our hearts."16 Although we as Christians
have the light of revelation to aid in this discovery, the natural law is
accessible to reason alone. This means that the natural law applies to
everyone, not just to believers.17 It seems strange, however, that
something in our hearts is called “law.” Why does it make sense to call it
this?
Law, in its most basic sense, is a plan of proper goals for the
common good, and the means to attain those goals, which plan is
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promulgated by someone in authority to those under his authority.18
This, in essence, is how Thomas Aquinas, as part of an ongoing tradition,
defines it. The ultimate authority is, of course, God who, as both reason
and revelation tell us, is the Creator of everything. Since a Creator
creates with a purpose, He establishes a goal, and the means to attain it,
for every creature. The attainment of that goal constitutes the creature’s
good, its fulfillment. In other words, God has in mind the Plan for every
type of creature; this plan, therefore, is law, eternal law.
How does God promulgate this law? Most creatures, of course,
cannot do otherwise than they do. To figure out God's plan for plants and
animals, we need only to watch what they are naturally moved to do.
Human beings, on the other hand, can freely reject God’s plan, but the
way we discover the plan is the same: we consider those things towards
which human beings are fundamentally inclined. This is what it means
to say that the law is “written in our hearts.” The law we discover here is
known as the natural law.
Those things toward which we are fundamentally inclined—for
example, self-preservation, sexual intercourse and the care of offspring,
knowledge of God and the world, love of others—point us to goals which
are fundamentally worth pursuing—that is, to natural goods. What goes
against these goods is unfitting to us, and must be avoided if we are to
reach our fulfillment as human beings. That fulfillment is not to be
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found in the pursuit of pleasure, power, money, fame or any ephemeral
thing that we can have, but just as easily lose. Rather, our fulfillment
lies in the excellent performance of the activities for which we were
created: knowing and loving. Actions are right or wrong, not in their
results, but in their relationship to this truth about human beings, to the
human dignity of the one who acts and the one who is acted upon.19
How do eternal and natural law apply to “positive law,” that is, to
ordinances established by a political authority? The natural law is “the
obligatory point of reference for civil law itself.”20 There are those who
argue that any ordinance that is made by a human authority demands
our obedience, that the power of law comes simply from its being
promulgated and enforced. Such a view is not a Catholic one. According
to a natural law approach, the ordinance must be directed appropriately
to a fitting goal, that is, one that is proper for human beings to pursue.
No dictate of any authority that violates our God-given human nature
makes sense. Indeed, an ordinance that violates the natural law is no
law at all.21 Consequently, a government that enacts or enforces such a
law is contradicting itself. This is one way to understand the claim of
Leo XIII that “a crime against religion is a sin against the State.”22 In
other words, whatever in positive law violates the moral law is an attack
not only against religion, but also against the very legitimacy of the
state. For these reasons, it is our duty to resist such "laws."23
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Correlatively, it is the duty of all rulers to rule in accordance with the
natural law. For whatever the form of government, all power comes from
God, and all proper authority derives from conformity with the natural
law.24

III: The State Serves the Human Person
This understanding of law puts the relationship between human
society and the state into proper perspective: the state itself makes sense
only insofar as it serves us. It exists as a means to human perfection,
and is at the service of the human person, the family, and the whole of
society.25 It exists, in other words, to protect justice and the common
good.26 One who has authority over a group must protect the goods of
individuals in relation to each other, and the good of the group as a
whole, the common good. In order to be legitimate, therefore, the state
must do what it can to bring about the common conditions that enable
human persons to attain fulfillment. By “fulfillment” we do not mean
material well-being, although this is by no means inconsequential.
Rather, “fulfillment” entails the achievement of human excellence—that
is, a life of virtue.27 This being so, it is never legitimate for the state to
support violations of the moral law by anyone, although occasionally it
may permit some violations for a suitably grave reason.28 It is never
legitimate for the state even to accept, let alone support, violations of
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fundamental justice and rights. Since human beings precede the state,
and are the reason for its existence, the state must, at the very least,
attempt to protect us from violations of those fundamental rights
without which we cannot move toward our proper end as human persons.
“The chief concern of civil authorities must therefore be to ensure that
these rights are recognized, respected, co-ordinated, defended and
promoted, and that each individual is enabled to perform his duties more
easily.”29
All societies aim at peace. As Aquinas notes, peace has two
elements: order and tranquility.30 Tranquility cannot be found without
order. This requires that the demands of justice be met.31 True peace, the
peace of Christ, must be a just one. But it is not simply justice; it is also
charity.32 While justice removes the impediments to peace, it is
completed through an act of self-giving love.33 Although the State can
guarantee justice, it has not the authority to guarantee charity.34
“Enforced charity” is a contradiction in terms. Nevertheless, human
beings need the opportunity to exercise this virtue.35 Thus the State is
required to smooth the path to charity through justice. True charity is
best performed at the level of organization closest to the problem. This is
because “needs are best understood and satisfied by people who are
closest to them and who act as neighbors to those in need.” Indeed,
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“certain kinds of demands often call for a response which is not simply
material, but which is capable of perceiving the deeper human need.”36
In performing its task of service to the person and society, the
state must not overstep its authority. Thus it must be guided in its
policies by the Principle of Subsidiarity. According to this principle, we
must not assign to a higher level of association what subordinate
organizations can accomplish.37 For example, the federal government
should not do what can be accomplished at the state or local level;
governmental organizations should not be responsible for what can be
accomplished by private organizations and individuals. A violation of
this principle constitutes "a grave evil and disturbance of right order,"
because it upends the relationship between society and state, putting
persons at the service of the state.38 Improper interference in, or
usurpation of, the proper responsibilities of those it exists to serve is
completely at odds with the state’s reason for existence. For example,
when a family is in deep economic distress, it may be right to help the
family with public aid if no private aid is forthcoming; when it suffers
from internal disturbance, it is right to intervene to safeguard the rights
of individuals. But the state may go no further: "setting aside the parent
and setting up a State supervision act[s] against natural justice, and
destroy[s] the structure of the home."39 Admittedly, a large measure of
prudence is necessary on the part of public authority. Under one set of
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circumstances, a government program may appear to be the only
workable solution to a particular social problem, while under somewhat
different circumstances, it might seem an overextension. People of good
will may reasonably disagree about the application of this principle in
the particular circumstances, without disagreeing in principle.

IV: Fundamental Rights
What, then, is most fundamental to a properly ordered state?
What is secondary? Which demands of justice and the common good are
more important than others?
The State must recognize the right to certain freedoms and
structures that are inseparable from the fulfillment of the human good.
There are three that top the list--or, to use a metaphor of John Paul II,
who is consistently eloquent on this subject, there are three which are at
the center of a series of concentric circles of rights.40 “First and
fundamental among these is the inviolable right to life of every innocent
human being.”41 This is the right not to be assaulted in one's person by
other persons, or by the state--except for the protection of the common
good and justice, as in capital punishment and a justified war.42 Without
this right in place, the logical principle at work is that either the state, or
each individual, is free to decide who counts, and then act on that
decision. A state that violates, or fails to enforce, this right acts in a
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manner contrary to its own reason for existence, the protection of those
under its authority. The logical outcome of this principle of action is
either totalitarianism or anarchy. In either event, it is the triumph of the
strong over the weak, of power over law, the elimination of society
itself.43 “At that point, everything is negotiable, everything is open to
bargaining; even the first of the fundamental rights, the right to life.”44
So, any outcry on behalf of other human rights is simply false if the right
to life is not maximally defended. This right anchors the very possibility
of any other rights in the state.45
In the second ring are the basic human rights of the individual,
primarily religious freedom and, implicit in this notion, freedom of
thought and conscience.46 Our relationship with God is constitutive of
individual existence, on the one hand, and essential to the structure of
society, on the other.47 The point of human life is not ultimately to be
found in this fallen world, but rather in God. A state which allows for,
and assists in, the living of a moral life will help the individual fulfill his
being and have something to show for his life when he is judged. In
addition, every individual must have the ability to practice his faith
freely in order to make living the moral life possible and to give it
meaning.48
Also in this group of fundamental rights—one might arguably
place it in this second ring along with religious freedom—there is the
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right to the protection and support of the primary unit of society, the
family.
The first and fundamental structure for “human ecology” is the
family, in which man receives his first formative ideas about truth
and goodness, and learns what it means to love and to be loved,
and thus what it actually means to be a person. Here we mean the
family founded on marriage, in which the mutual gift of self by
husband and wife creates an environment in which children can
be born and develop their potentialities, become aware of their
dignity and prepare to face their unique and individual destiny.49
No other grouping of persons is as fundamentally important to human
development as the “nuclear family” founded on the marriage of man and
woman.50 Nor can any other person or institution other than the parents
hold the primary responsibility for the education of children.51 Any
attempts to undermine this reality--for example, the fostering of
competing views of the institution of marriage, or the usurpation of
parental rights and duties by the state--are, for that reason, assaults on
the family, and therefore assaults on the good of both the individual and
society itself.52 Thus the Council Fathers wrote:
All those, therefore, who exercise influence over communities and
social groups should work efficiently for the welfare of marriage
and the family. Public authority should regard it as a sacred duty
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to recognize, protect and promote their authentic nature, to shield
public morality and to favor the prosperity of home life.53
As John Paul describes it, further circles of rights emanate from
this center: civil rights, guaranteeing various individual freedoms
helpful to human fulfillment; and political rights, enabling the citizen to
engage in public affairs. He goes on to mention another ring of social and
cultural rights, and a "third generation" of rights concerning human
development and control of the environment.54 This metaphor of
concentric rings of rights has not, to my knowledge, been worked out.
The relation between the fundamental rights and further rights and
freedoms certainly needs further exploration, which we can only begin
here. It is, however, a potentially rich and useful metaphor.
One aspect which makes the first three rights (life, religion,
family) fundamental is the fact that they follow from the very definition
of the human person, both as an individual and as a social being. They
are rights without which a state cannot possibly be just, for without
them, the state itself would be complicit in an assault upon the very
beings it exists to serve.55 In other words, there are no circumstances
under which a refusal of, or violation of, these rights is anything but an
injustice, and thus a basic failure in the state’s use of authority.
The second aspect which makes these three rights fundamental is
that there is really only one way properly to instantiate them, and that is
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fully and completely. In such matters, there is no room for prudential
judgment about whether the conditions of justice have been met—no
room, therefore, for people of good will to disagree. Failure to instantiate
these rights is not simply a neutral lack, but an assault on both person
and state. For example, the state must protect the lives of citizens from
others. Any refusal to do so—as in abortion—entails a competing
principle (i.e., that it is permisible for private citizens to kill one
another), which is fundamentally at odds with the natural law
understanding of both the person and the state. Similarly, the state must
protect the freedoms of religious belief and practice in keeping with the
natural law. Refusal to do so—as in outlawing the public display of
religious symbols—entails a competing principle (i.e., that it is
permissible for private citizens or the state to keep a person from his
proper relationship with his Creator). In like manner, the state must
protect the rights and welfare of the nuclear family as defined earlier.
Refusals of, or violations of, this protection—as in the recognition of
homosexual unions—entail the adoption of principles contradictory to
the definition of marriage and family.
We noted earlier that there are two possible times when the state
may legitimately take human life: capital punishment and war.
Following the natural law, the Church is not opposed to either of these
tools of governance in themselves. She is, however, opposed to their
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illegitimate use. In each case, however, the decision about whether any
particular situation requires their use is a matter of prudential judgment
on the part of those in authority.56 Naturally, the Church urges us to
resist the use of these violent means if at all possible. However, people of
good will can reasonably disagree about when the limits of forbearance
have been reached. They are, of course, issues bearing on human life, but
(as our opening quote from the U.S. Bishops makes clear) their
legitimate use is not an issue of fundamantal right.57

V: Relating Fundamental Rights to Subsidiary Rights
The further rings of rights which follow from the first three (life,
religion, family) have characteristics different from those of the first
three. First of all,they make sense only when the first three have been
acknowledged as fundamental. From the primacy of the nuclear family,
for example, there follows the necessity of protecting the proper
conditions for family life. The rights to these protections, therefore,
precede the State.58 For example, human persons have a right to private
property59; to earnings sufficient to support their families60; to the
provision of as decent a level of health care as can be reasonably
provided61; and to assistance when they are unable to provide for
themselves.62 However, a right or claim to these goods—and subsequemt
regulation by the state—makes sense only insofar as they serve the
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fundamental three sets of rights—that is, insofar as they serve the
proper ends of the human person.63
Secondly, the claim to such rights, unlike the fundamental three,
can be meaningfully and truly satisfied in many ways. Charity, the
principle of solidarity, and the universal destination of goods demand
that we help others in need when we have an abundance of goods, but
the state itself need not always provide the assistance.64 Indeed, the
principle of subsidiarity assumes it will not do so except as a last
resort.65 When it does, assistance may legitimately take place in many
forms—a primary one being the creation of jobs.66 Health care is a right
that is limited by the availability of resources, and may be administered
in any number of just ways. What counts as a living wage depends to a
great extent on cultural factors, like what the society counts as basic
necessities, or who in the family is expected to contribute to the family's
finances.67 The wage is not a concept applicable to the self-employed, so
the right to support one’s family must be applied differently for such
persons. And while private property is a necessity of human dignity,
ownership of property may be regulated by the State in various ways for
the sake of the common good.68
Many political rights are of the same character. Political rights
enable the citizen to participate more fully in the life of the community.
There are, however, many methods for doing so, and the Church is not
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committed to any particular system.69 The task of the human person is to
achieve his proper end, which is heaven. He may well do so within any
political system. However, every state is constrained by the demands of
justice: it may never violate the three sets of fundamental rights (life,
religion, family), and it must establish the conditions which enable its
citizens to carry out the duties which follow from his nature as a human
individual, as a family member, and as a creature of God.
It is important to establish here the relationship of the outer rings
of rights to the first three central ones. We could reasonably call them
second and third level rights. The second level rights are those which are
discoverable, because they follow logically from more fundamental rights
grounded in human nature. For example, we have an natural right to
private property, including productive property. This is grounded in the
necessity that human beings provide for themselves and their families
into the future.70 However, policies concerning ownership may promote
the good of the person, and the family, and the common good of society,
in more than one way. How the implementation of rights such as these
best serves the good of the human person is a matter of prudential
judgment. Thus, different people may have a difference of opinion over
what property may be privately owned, or the conditions of such
ownership. They may disagree over whether a particular tax is proper or
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confiscatory. Even so, they may still agree in principle and aim at the
accomplishment of the same good.
Third level rights follow from the more central ones, not as logical
consequences, but as useful means to the accomplishment of the good of
the human person. These are rights in a somewhat different sense. The
first and second level rights are natural rights which precede the state,
and which may not be denied. For instance, one could claim a second
level right to travel freely. One might want to say it leads logically to the
right to drive a car. But what if I cannot afford a car, or am only twelve
years old? What if no one is manufacturing cars? And if I may drive a
car, may I drive it anywhere—on private property, or inside a building?
May I drive at any speed I desire? The right to drive a car may follow
from my right to travel freely, but there are reasonable limitations which
may be placed on that right. For sufficient reason, I may even be denied
the right to drive, without being able to claim that I have suffered harm,
or even that it has impinged on my right to travel freely.

VI: Some Intermediate Conclusions
How does all this information add up? Let’s connect the dots.
What we know is that a state can support the three fundamental sets of
rights in only one way—fully and completely—without employing
contradictory principles. The second level rights are natural rights which
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precede the state, but which may reasonably be implemented in a
number of ways. The third level rights do not precede the state, but are
recognized as rights only insofar as they are taken to be useful means for
giving substance to the more fundamental rights. These, too, can be
reasonably implemented in various ways. Thus, even when people of
good will have acknowledged the subsidiary rights, there is room for
disagreement as to how best to implement them. There will be, to use the
common terms, more "conservative" or more "liberal" methods for trying
to instantiate these rights, but in choosing one way over another, we are
still aiming to bring about the good. The choice is strictly one of
prudential judgment.
The social teaching of the Church since Leo XIII has been
remarkable for its emphasis on these civil and political rights—for
example, for its promotion of labor unions, or for its insistence on social
institutions which reduce poverty. Two things should be noticed in this
regard, however. First, the popes spoke to these concerns in situations
where the protection of life, religious freedom, and the family were
already assumed. Where these rights were threatened or absent, as in
Nazi Germany or Communist China, they spoke forcefully about the
most fundmental rights rather than the secondary ones.71 The Church
recognizes that the subsidiary rights are rights only insofar as they serve
what is fitting for human persons—and in some circumstances human
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persons and the common good are best served by a limitation of rights.
The ownership of property, for example, is fundamentally necessary for
the proper good of human individuals and families. Sometimes, however,
the human good is better served by limiting that right—through
taxation, for example, or the right of eminent domain. Political rights,
like the right to vote, are useful to the full participation of the person in
the life of the community, and therefore can be very good. While it would
be unreasonable to deny the vote to people able to use it properly, it
would not be unreasonble to deny it in circumstances where it would
clearly hinder rather than promote the common good. On the other hand,
no such argument can be made about the fundamental rights. Human
fulfillment cannot be served if fundamental rights are violated; thus, the
state must make every effort to protect them in full.
This, then, is the recipe for the common good. The life of the
individual person must be protected from assault. Respect for conscience
and religious worship must be ensured. The nuclear family as the
fundamental unit of society must not be undermined in any way, but
must be given special protection, more so even than other worthy social
groups. Whatever else is necessary to the fulfillment of the human good,
both individual and common, must be acknowledged and protected, after
a prudent investigation of the different opinions on how these subsidiary
rights would best be implemented in the current situation. The whole
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plan must work toward one basic goal: the fulfillment of the human
person. Lest there be any misunderstanding about what anchors
everything, let me quote from a talk John Paul II gave at the end of his
1987 visit to the United States:

The best traditions of your land presume respect for those who
cannot defend themselves. If you want equal justice for all and
true freedom and lasting peace, then, America, defend life! All the
great causes that are yours today will have meaning only to the
extent that you guarantee the right to life and protect the human
person:
-Feeding the poor and welcoming refugees.
-Reinforcing the social fabric of this nation.
-Promoting the true advancement of women.
-Securing the rights of minorities.
-Pursuing disarmament, while guaranteeing legitimate
defense.
All this will succeed only if respect for life and its protection by the
law is granted to every human being from conception until natural
death.72

VII: The Meaning of a Vote
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The principles outlined above should help Catholic voters identify
the relative importance of certain social issues. But how are we to
implement these principles? To answer this question, it is necessary to
discuss the meaning of voting.
Most simply put, a vote is essentially a “yes” or “no,” acceptance or
rejection, a statement of preference between two (or more) possible states
of affairs. It is an act of making a choice, and is thus a deeply human act,
one that fully involves our reason and our will. Because voting is such a
fundamental statement of my choice, it is an intensely personal act. To
vote in a way that is most fully human, I must vote freely and with full
knowledge of what I am doing. In the public setting with which we are
here concerned, my choice involves the good of human society; thus it is
very clearly a moral act. Voting is therefore an act of conscience. It would
not do, in my vote, to appeal to the freedom of other people to act
according to their consciences. Here, I must act according to mine alone.
Now one might explain a vote—whether it is concerned with small
everyday things or larger matters of public policy—as essentially an act
of self-interest. This would serve as an adequate explanation of voting
only if human beings were, in the core of their being, purely selfinterested. Catholicism rejects such an idea of the human person. Selfinterest may, of course, be the motivating factor behind many actual
votes. Our task, however, is to offer a justification for our votes. This
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means we must ask what are the right reasons for a vote, so that we may
act in a properly human way.
Since we are here considering society, government and law, let us
confine our discussion to the ways we can vote with regard to these
matters. If voting is properly an act of my conscience, then what I am
trying to do when I vote is to bring into reality my vision of how the
world ought to be. I must take into account everything that was stated
above about what is a properly human vision of society, government and
law. That means that my vote must be an attempt to promote, not my
private interests, but the common good.
There are two kinds of votes I can cast: a) a direct vote (as an
elected lawmaker, or as a citizen in a plebiscite) for or against a
particular law or policy; or b) a vote for or against a person who will
represent me, who will in turn be involved in making the laws. In the
first type of vote, I attempt most directly to bring about my vision of the
common good. Most of the time, however, I make use of the second type,
election of a representative.
How am I to understand my vote for a representative? If I could
elect a representative who would necessarily, in every instance, vote for
exactly the public policies and laws I would vote for were I the legislator,
then I could view the election as nothing more than putting into place a
machine. Voting for this machine would be no different than voting on
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the policy myself. Of course, candidates for public office are not
machines. They are people with their own consciences, which they are
obliged to follow. In other words, the best I can do is to vote for someone
for office who will attempt to bring into reality his vision of the common
good. The question then naturally arises: “Can I accept my
representative’s vision of the common good?” I must be able to respond:
“Yes, I can accept his vision (at least under the present circumstances),
even if I cannot fully approve it.” Why does this matter?
Whether I vote directly for a law, or indirectly for a
representative, I am cooperating in the actions of others. Because of this
fact, my vote implicates me in their actions insofar as I am aware
beforehand of the intentions of those whose actions my vote would
authorize. If I act directly as a lawmaker by voting for a particular
measure, I authorize citizens by law to perform certain actions. In order
to do this morally, I must be able to accept these actions. Similarly, if I
elect a representative to make the laws for us, I find his vision of reality
acceptable, and authorize him to bring it about. Notice that my vote does
not say that I like what the lawmaker stands for; rather it says that I
find what he claims he will vote for, and the actions it authorizes, to be
permissible given the circumstances, something I may accept and, by my
vote, do accept. So, what are we to make of a situation in which the
action to be authorized is evil?
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VIII: Principles of Cooperation and Voting
According to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, we are
responsible for our cooperation in the evil acts of others when we a)
directly participate; b) order, advise, praise or approve; c) fail to disclose
or hinder the evil when we have an obligation to do so; or d) protect evildoers.73 Any one of the last three situations is possible when we vote.
May I cooperate in the evil acts of another? It depends. There are
two kinds of cooperation. Formal cooperation is when I share in the
intent of the person committing the evil action. The problem with
sharing this intent is that I am therefore deliberately choosing the evil,
which I may never do. Material cooperation, on the other hand, is
offering assitance which makes the action possible, or easier. If I do this
by direct participation in the act—that is, I actually do part of the job—I
would, in essence, be sharing in the intent to do evil. However, if my
material assistance is mediated, I may be able to do an act which is itself
good or indifferent, which nonetheless has a bad outcome—that is, it
supplies the means for a wrongful act—an outcome which I do not
intend, but which I may accept under certain circumstances.74
The principles of cooperation in an evil act are species of the
principle of double effect. In order to be legitimate, there must be a
proportionately serious reason for the cooperation--that is, the effect of
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not cooperating is proportionately more harmful than cooperating. That
proportion, between the harm done by cooperating as opposed to not
cooperating, relies on two other factors.
The first factor is the proximity of my cooperation to the evil act.
The more remotely my action is connected to the evil act of the other
person, the less closely I am implicated in his evil, and therefore the less
grave need be the reason for my cooperation. A very proximate act of
cooperation requires a quite serious reason: it is permitted only if it is
necessary to avoid serious harm. A very remote cooperation requires a
good, though less serious, reason.
The second factor is the necessity of my own personal cooperation.
My act is considered necessary if I am the only person whose cooperation
will bring about the completion of the evil act. Such an act is permissible
only if it is necessary to avoid some proportionately serious harm. If, on
the other hand, others are available to perform the cooperative act, my
act is deemed non-necessary. In this situation, since my lack of
cooperation is not going to stop the evil act, then the reasons for
cooperation need not be quite so serious. Cooperation which is both
remote and non-necessary requires much less serious reasons to meet
the requiremets of proportionality than cooperation which is both
proximate and necessary.
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Now how do I understand my vote in light of these principles?
First of all, it is clear that my vote is never a direct participation in the
evil or good acts of another. However, my cooperation may be objectively
formal if the reason I vote to permit an evil is that I actually want to
bring about that evil. Assuming this is not my intention, my cooperation
would be material and mediate, and a judgment needs to be made about
proximity, necessity and proportionality.
Is a vote a proximate or remote cooperation? I would judge it to be
proximate. Indeed, it seems it may be as near as one can get to an
immediate cooperation in the act of another without actually crossing the
line. Authorization by those in charge is absolutely necessary for evil
actions to become permissible under positive law. In other words, such
authorization is necessary to establish the rules in positive law which
violate natural law principles. Of course, a vote for a representative who
intends to authorize such actions is at least somewhat removed from the
evil acts of citizens—but it is proximate to the evil acts of the
representative. Without the votes which put him in office, he has no
authority to proceed.
Is my vote necessary to the completion of the evil act, or not? This
is a bit trickier to establish. The typical examples in the literature on
material cooperation involve the necessity of my cooperation, and no one
else’s; cooperation is non-necessary when there are others equally
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competent, and willing, to substitute for me. Votes of lawmakers, or
votes for representatives, clearly do not work in this way; we are not
talking about the act of replaceable functionaries. As we noted above, the
vote is necessary to the completion of the evil, but the vote is usually not
that of one person (just my vote, for example), but of the plurality or
majority of a group (e.g., a legislature, or the voting public). “Necessary”
must therefore be understood a bit differently here. Let us say that all
eligible voters actually participate in a particular election, and that the
candidate I vote for wins by one vote. Clearly, my vote is absolutely
necessary for his victory. However, if my candidate wins by two votes, we
might say that someone’s vote is not necessary—but whose?And what if
not all eligible voters participate? The fact of the matter is, we do not
know whether any particular vote is necessary or not until after the
votes are counted. For this reason, I must enter each voting situation
thinking that my vote has the potential to be the deciding vote—indeed,
that my vote may be the only vote cast. At least from the point of view of
the voter, then, every vote may well constitute a necessary cooperation in
the actions of those whom my vote authorizes to act. However, I do not
know this with certainty. Indeed, our experience is that this rarely
happens. This leaves us with room for judgment. Precisely because I do
not know whether my vote in this situation is absolutely necessary, a
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certain amount of prudence is required to determine the likelihood that
my vote will have such an impact.
For these reasons, then, my vote should be viewed as proximate
and, quite possibly, necessary to the acts of others; at the very least, I
have no business assuming that my vote will not matter. Any
cooperation in their evil acts may only be permitted for proportionate
and extremely grave cause.
Now we have in place two sets of principles: a) a set
demonstrating the seriousness of the goods or evils we might cooperate
in by our vote, which enable us to analyze the proportion involved in
such a decision (Sections I-VI); and b) a set explaining the circumstances
under which it is legitimate to cooperate in another's actions, which in
essence is what one does when one votes (Sections VII-VIII). Two
application questions arise, then: 1) How do these principles apply when
a lawmaker votes to make laws? 2) How do these principles apply when
we vote for our representatives?

IX: The Votes of Lawmakers
Those who make the laws must first of all have a proper vision of
the state and its relation to the moral law; that is, they must realize that
positive laws may never violate the moral law. So the lawmaker may not
pursue a course of action supporting violations of the moral law. Politics
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being the art of the possible, however, he may not be able to effect his
vision without assistance from others, and this may mean compromise.
The lawmaker must recognize, in this case, which values he may
sacrifice, which values he may only compromise as a form of legitimate
material cooperation, and which values he may not compromise at all.
He must, therefore, be ready to act according to the hierarchy of rights
outlined in sections III, IV and V.
At the center of the hierarchy of rights (following John Paul II’s
metaphor of concentric rings) is the right to life. In the next ring are the
fundamental rights related to the individual (religious freedom) and
society (the nuclear family). Another metaphor which might be useful is
the arch: religious freedom and the family are the sides, with the right to
life as the keystone. These three must all be respected--the first for the
very possibility of society and state, the other two for the possibility of
attaining our proper ends as human persons. The lawmaker who does
not respect these rights is working against the good of society and the
good of the person. Any assault on these rights is intrinsically wrong.
The next rings, of civil, political, social and economic rights, follow
from the first three central ones. The secondary level natural rights
follow logically from the central ones. Their existence precedes the state,
though they can be instantiated in various ways. How the right is
implemented depends on the circumstances of time and place, and is
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thus subject to the prudential judgment of the lawmaker. But even if a
legislator wished to limit these rights for immoral reasons, or worse, to
deny them entirely, he would not commit so fundamental an assault
against the state, society, or the person as he would by favoring an assault
on the fundamental three sets of rights.
The third level rights follow from the more central ones as useful
means to the accomplishment of the human good. They do not precede
the state as such, though it might be unreasonable, even unjust, to deny
a person a particular right under particular circumstances. These rights
exist insofar as they have been implemented by lawful authority to serve
more fundamental human rights and dignity. They may, of course, be
instantiated in many different ways, as matters of prudence. Failure to
provide these rights would not constitute an assault against the state or
society, and would be a violation of the good of the person only insofar as
their denial is unreasonable.
In Evangelium vitae 71-73, John Paul II is very clear about the
duty of the legislator (i.e., my representative, or any one of us in a
plebiscite) regarding the "first and fundamental" right, the "source of all
other rights"--that is, the right to life. Disregard for this right "is what
most directly conflicts with the possibility of achieving the common
good." Our obligation to oppose abortion and euthanasia, and all direct
assaults on innocent human life, is "grave and clear." He quotes the
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Declaration on Procured Abortion (CDF, 1973): "In case of an
intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia,
it is therefore never licit to obey it, or to 'take part in a propoganda
campaign in favour of such a law, or vote for it.'" The Pope recognizes one
small area of legitimate material cooperation in this regard: one may
vote for a law which allows abortion or euthanasia only when it is not
possible to get a complete victory, so as to limit harm. In doing so, one
must avoid scandal by making clear one's opposition to the evil, and by
explaining the reasons for the cooperation.75 This principle, it seems to
me, applies as well to matters pertaining to religious freedom and the
protection of the family structure.76

X: Voting for Elected Officials
There is not, to my knowledge, any document of the Church that
has explicitly and fully applied these principles to citizens voting for
their representatives, as she has to legislators. However, consistently
applied, the principles show us a clear path to follow. Voting for a
representative differs, of course, from voting directly for a law; one is not
voting directly for a set of policies, but rather for a person. Reason insists
that our government officials be good people, worthy of our trust. Since
"legislation is the work of men invested with power," notes Leo XIII,
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the quality of the laws depends more on the quality of these men
than upon the form of power. The laws will be good or bad
accordingly as the minds of the legislators are imbued with good
or bad principles, and as they allow themselves to be guided by
political prudence or by passion . . . . 77
The test of the worthiness of a person for office, then, is wisdom. This is
measured by the candidate’s relationship to the truth. Without wisdom,
he is severely crippled in his ability to bring about the good.
In this regard, we must be careful not to confuse wisdom with
either high intelligence or sincerity. Too often, we are convinced that the
person who demonstrates the highest intelligence quotient, as evidenced
by an easy command of massive amounts of facts, numerous university
degrees, or a capacity for witty repartee, is thus the obvious person for
the job. This might be true were public office a merely technical position,
and a public official's intellect merely a cog in the great governmental
machine. Intellect in itself is neither virtuous nor vicious. It may be
grounded in the truth, or it may not. Our public officials, however, must
be men of virtue, in terms both of morality and of practical knowledge
(the knowledge of our proper ends, and the means to attain them). True
wisdom is not the same as intelligence or cleverness.
As to sincerity, it is hard to say who is more dangerous: a) the
person who, sincerely and with all his heart, believes that what is wrong
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is right, and strives to bring about that evil; or b) the person who
believes that what is wrong is right, but gives the appearance of
believing the opposite. A person can appear sincere, without really being
connected with the truth. Neither the hypocrite, nor the person who
sincerely supports what is objectively wrong, is grounded in the truth.
On the other hand, we must take care not to confuse a candidate's
apparent personal prejudices with his or her program for political action.
For example, a person might let slip a racially dergoatory remark,
though he never had performed, nor would ever intend to perform, a
racially discriminatory act. While those biases may be revealing, they
reveal thoughtless habit more often than a considered relationship with
the truth.78
What are we to say about a legislator who supports a regime of
abortion and euthanasia, or who seeks by law to exclude any specifically
religious points of view from public life, or who favors policies directly
destructive of the family, such as sexual license or same sex "marriage,"
or forms of state control over the upbringing of children? We would have
to say that such a person is not grounded in the truth about human
beings, or about the relationship between morality and the law, or about
the proper structure of the state. Such a person would favor policies
which are directly at odds with our understanding of the most basic
things necessary for human flourishing.
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Now, I must ask myself, simply from a tactical point of view, why I
would wish to elect to office a person so fundamentally at odds with my
own vision of the good. It would seem rather foolish. Far more important
than this tactical question, though, is whether I may morally support
such a candidate. Remember that a vote for the candidate is a
cooperation in his actions. Through my vote, I intend to put him in the
position to bring about those policies he claims he wants to enact, both
good and bad, both just and unjust. To justify my vote, I would have to
say either a) that his policies are morally acceptable ones, or at the very
least b) that there are proportionately serious reasons for putting up
with the morally unacceptable policies he favors.
Obviously, it would be absolutely illegitimate to favor this
candidate for office because of his support for laws which are evil or
unjust, either intrinsically or situationally. This is formal cooperation, a
sharing in the candidate’s evil intention. Could there, however, be a
proportionately serious reason to vote for him or her? If what we noted
earlier about my level of cooperation in the representative’s actions is
correct, then we must employ the strictest standards here: there must be
a proportionate and very serious reason for accepting such a candidate.
We must use the hierarchy of rights to weigh the proportionate
seriousness of the policies the candidate wishes to enact.
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Nothing is as important as the right to life. Allowing private
citizens first to decide who counts, and then to act on that decision, is
logically to advocate not the rule of law, but anarchy, the destruction of
the state and society. Such a position, if acted upon, renders impossible
the achievement of both the common good, and the good of the
individuals killed. The bishops of the United States have been forceful in
their call to Christians in this regard:
The Gospel of Life must be proclaimed, and human life defended,
in all places and all times. The arena for moral responsibility
includes not only the halls of government, but the voting booth as
well. Laws that permit abortion, euthanasia and assisted suicide
are profoundly unjust, and we should work peacefully and
tirelessly to oppose and change them. Because they are unjust
they cannot bind citizens in conscience, be supported, acquiesced
in, or recognized as valid. Our nation cannot countenance the
continued existence in our society of such fundamental violations
of human rights.79
Religious freedom and the protection of the family are next in
seriousness. Without them, the state and society can exist, but citizens
are substantially prevented from pursuing their proper ends as human
beings. If the state fails to guarantee these rights, it is working to the
detriment of those whom it exists to serve.
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Second and third level rights have a situational aspect. In other
words, policies designed to support (or limit) these rights are appropriate
depending on whether or not they actually assist in bringing about the
goods promised in the fundamental three. Failure to have these rights in
place does not absolutely prevent us from attaining our proper human
ends. However, that failure may substantively impair our pursuit of
these ends (as in second level rights), or unreasonably deprive us of
important means for attaining them (as in third level rights). While it is
true that these civil, economic, and political rights do in fact promote the
good of the individual and the family, we must remember that many of
these rights can be achieved in various and equally permissible ways.
Thus, one candidate may support universal health care, another
completely privatized health care, and both would be pursuing the same
good in permissible ways. These are issues of prudential judgment, not of
fundamental justice. So, while I might disagree with a particular policy
as a matter of prudence, I may still accept that policy.
The last category of policies would have to do, not with rights, but
with the positive laws which are conducive to public order and
organization. Examples would be traffic laws, and ordinances requiring
residents to shovel the sidewalk when it snows. Whatever laws are
reasonable and do not fail in justice are permissible.
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How do I use this information in the voting booth? In any election
there are at least two candidates from which to choose. Of course, if
there is one candidate with whom I completely agree, I will have no
difficulty deciding for whom to vote. In reality, however, it is rarely that
simple. Usually, I disagree with every candidate about something. In
making a choice, the question becomes one of the proportionate moral
seriousness of the policies over which we disagree—that is, of the
proportionate seriousness of the candidate's connection (or failure to
connect) with the truth. Each ring of rights raises a set of issues on
completely different levels. Policies concerned with rights in the outer
rings only incidentally involve justice issues—that is, they are just or
unjust based on accidental circumstances. These policies are always
outweighed by policies concerning rights in the inner rings, which
inherently entail rights and justice. The right to life is proportionately
far more serious than all the others, since it is the anchor for all other
rights.

XI: Some Applications
It should be useful to try to apply these principles to some concrete
(albeit hypothetical) situations. I have included here some situations
which I have actually encountered, some which I have created to test the
theory, and some suggested to me by critical readers. While I believe
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that these applications follow from principles stated and emphasized in
Church teaching, it is well to note that they go beyond what is explicitly
contained in doctrinal statements.
Suppose we have two candidates, Mr. A and Ms. B. Let us suppose
that, in terms of the outer rings of rights and their implementation, you
and Mr. A could not be more completely in agreement. In your best
judgment, Mr. A's plans regarding distribution of health care, the
minimum wage, welfare, social security, unions, education funding,
affirmative action, the treatment of criminals, and national security, are
all, in your opinion, exactly right. Ms. B, however, has an approach to
these issues with which, as a matter of prudential judgment, you
strongly disagree. The difficulty you find, however, is that Mr. A is in
favor of opening the definition of "marriage" to include relationships
other than that of one man and one woman. Ms. B, on the other hand, is
opposed to such changes.
One might argue that we ought not get too caught up in this one
issue, and few of us wish to be thought of as "single issue" voters.
However, this one issue completely outweighs all the others mentioned.
It involves an issue of fundamental justice and the good of the basic
social unit, the family. It would be more proper to call it a "singular
issue."80 Mr. A's position on marriage is one which may not be morally
taken. The other issues as outlined here are matters of prudence; one
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could be on either side of the debate, and still be holding a morally
permissible position. As it stands Mr. A has a plan to support, along with
some good things, something intrinsically evil. Ms. B is supporting the
same good things--though by different means--and also intends to use
her actions to defeat this intrinsic evil. And even if some of Ms. B’s
proposed policies were, in fact, contrary to justice, they would not attack
the good of human persons and society fundmentally, as do Mr. A’s
proposals.
What reason might be put forward for supporting Mr. A over Ms.
B? The most likely reason would be that, given the two candidates'
programs, it would do more harm than good to support Ms. B. This,
however, supposes some sort of parity between the issues involved. But
we have shown that there is no parity. The evil that Mr. A intends to
support is on a completely different level. A vote for Mr. A is a form of
cooperation in his proposed actions. In order to vote for him, I would
have to either a) intend the good or evil he intends—which I do not—or
b) have a proportionately serious reason for materially cooperating in his
evil. But there is no proportionately serious reason for supporting Mr. A.
Thus, to support him would constitute an objectively grave evil.
What if Mr. A is running, not against Ms. B, but rather against
Mr. C, who is not only in favor of homosexual marriage, but also
legalized prostitution and a special tax on all church-related schools. In

43

this case, I have a choice between bad and proportionately worse. Now I
can make a case for material cooperation with Mr. A, because the evil
Mr. C plans to bring about is more serious than the evil Mr. A supports.
Thus, I could vote for Mr. A, provided I do not share in his evil intent,
but only intend the good he plans, and I look to replace him in the next
election with someone who does not support these evils.
Here is an intriguing election possibility. Ms. A favors abortion
rights across the board. Mr. B favors most abortion rights, but is against
partial birth abortion and would like to see parental notification laws.
Both of these candidates are running strong in the polls. Mr. C, on the
other hand, is fully opposed to abortion and euthanasia and embryonic
stem cell research, but is only making a three percent showing in the
polls. In other words, Mr. C is the best candidate, but it is highly
unlikely that he will be elected. Must one vote for Mr. C? I think the
answer is no; I might reasonably choose Mr. B under the circumstances.
I appeal here to the principle of material cooperation for the lawmaker in
Evangelium vitae 73, mentioned above in Section VIII: one may vote for
a law which allows abortion or euthanasia only when it is not possible to
get a complete victory, so as to limit harm. I believe the same principle
may be applicable in this instance to the case of voting for a
representative. The intention involved in voting for Mr. B over Mr. C is
not to approve of Mr. B’s policies in their own right, but to perform an act
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which has the best chance of limiting the proportionately serious harm
which might otherwise be done by Ms. A. It must be clear, as before, that
I will vote against Mr. B if that option is reasonably available.
Many people (I have a number of friends among them) who are
morally opposed to abortion, euthanasia, embryonic stem cell research
and the like, nonetheless consistently vote for legislators and executives
who support these things. They use the following reasoning: “Prolife
candidate P is in no position to change the situation. She will have little
chance to bring or sign any legislation this term. Neither will prochoice
candidate Q. However, Q will be in a position to help enact other
important legislation which I support. Therefore I will vote for candidate
Q.” This argument sounds intriguingly similar to our last situation.
However, I think there are important differences.
First, in the previous case, I would be voting to limit the harm
against life already in place, which would be furthered by Ms. A. That
principle of limiting the harm does not apply to the situation of
candidates P and Q. Here, the argument is to abandon the cause of life
entirely, so as to effect other goods—far less important goods. Second,
one has to wonder what the basis is for assuming that candidate P will
not be able to effect her legislation, while candidate Q will be able to
effect his. Is it because there are clearly far more votes on the prodeath
side than the prolife side? Is it because candidate P is a neophyte, while
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candidate Q is a veteran legislator? All the more reason to get candidate
P into office, so that he can help change the balance, and become an
effective leader. Perhaps nothing will change this term—but what about
next term? We should all remember well the lessons of partial birth
abortion legislation in Washington. Twice it passed through Congress,
only to be rejected by President Clinton. The third time through,
President Bush signed it into law. But it would never have reached
either president’s desk if we had refused to elect legislators to office
because “it was unlikely to pass.”
Throughout our deliberations prior to an election, we must always
remember the hierarchy of values. There is no right with a higher value
than the right to life. A candidate who favors abortion or euthanasia
must be rejected unless the opposing candidates are even more proabortion or pro-euthanasia. A candidate who supports abortion through
all nine months is worse than one who only wants abortion legal in the
first trimester; a candidate who supports abortion for any reason is
worse than one who supports it only in tragic circumstances. A candidate
who supports both abortion and euthanasia is worse than one who
supports only one. A candidate who wants to keep parents out of the
abortion decisions of their minor children not only supports abortion, but
also acts which are destructive of the family. But these are differences
only of degree within the innermost ring. The point we have been
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striving to make is that the distinction between circles is one of kind;
there is no proportionality between one ring and another.
One may be tempted to blur the distinctions between circles when
the circles are adjoining. Say, for example, that candidate X supports
abortion on demand, but is opposed to homosexual unions. Candidate Y,
however, is strongly prolife, but just as strongly in favor of homosexual
unions. Let us further say that they would represent a strongly proabortion, and increasingly pro-homosexual, state. Do I have to go with
candidate Y over candidate X? Will prudence allow the abandonment of
the higher, more central value in favor of the lesser, but still very
important, value? We must ask the same questions as before: On what
basis are we convinced that the abortion fight is beyond hope, but the
marriage fight is not? On what basis are we convinced that candidate X
will have an influence, but candidate Y will have none? If either issue
could be identified as based on a principle the application of which people
of good will could disagree about, the answer would be easy. As it stands,
it is difficult for me to see how the less central value of the family—
important as it is—can be proportionate to the most central value of life,
even if there appears to be a better chance of making the law concerning
the lesser value better.
These sorts of problems in application (and others like them) are
important in that they force us to face the difficulties in applying general

47

principles to concrete situations. On the other hand, how likely is it that
we will face a scenario like the last one? Is it not far more likely that a
candidate will be either consistently in favor of traditional views on life,
religion and family, or consistently opposed to those traditional
positions? This will usually be the case, because these issues are
connected in a coherent vision of the person, morality, law and
government.
In light of this observation, let me make one last argument,
perhaps the most daring one of this paper. So important are these
principles in our decisions about whom to elect to office, that I believe
they should be applied to every candidate for public office—for instance,
to city council—even if his office has no direct connection to the making
of laws concerning these fundamental rights. Every public official should
have to take a public stand on questions of life, religion and family, for in
doing so he reveals his underlying vision of person, morality, law and
government. Unless his office is that of a mere functionary, which can be
filled by anyone with technical expertise, the candidate will have to bring
his wisdom to bear on the common good in the execution of that office.
This vision—this wisdom, or lack thereof—is by this fact the single most
important qualification for holding public office. As a practical point,
even when the office in question has very little direct influence on these
“inner ring” issues of fundamental rights, every election raises that
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official just a bit higher in public stature, and thus in the ability to assert
his leadership, for good or ill, through increased power. We voters should
never pretend that these issues sometimes do not matter in an election.
They always matter.

XII: Conclusion
If there is a head to this article, it is the intellectual and spiritual
argumentation laid out by one hundred and twenty-five years of social
encyclicals. If there is a heart to this article, it is the plea to act, and to
act in particular ways. Let me close by returning, one last time, to
“Living the Gospel of Life,” for I can think of no better way to sum up the
heart of this article than the following words:
We encourage all citizens, particularly Catholics, to embrace their
citizenship not merely as a duty and privilege, but as an
opportunity meaningfully to participate in building the culture of
life. Every voice matters in the public forum. Every vote counts.
Every act of responsible citizenship is an exercise of significant
individual power. We must exercise that power in ways that
defend human life, especially those of God’s children who are
unborn, disabled or otherwise vulnerable. We get the public
officials we deserve. Their virtue—or lack thereof—is a judgment
not only on them, but on us. Because of this, we urge our fellow
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citizens to see beyond party politics, to analyze campaign rhetoric
critically, and to choose their political leaders according to
principle, not party affiliation or mere self-interest.81
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